A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
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Publication:6536583
DOI10.3982/ecta16310zbMath1541.91025MaRDI QIDQ6536583
Publication date: 13 May 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
ascending auctionslimited foresightextensive-form gamesplanning horizon(strong) obvious strategy-proofnessone-step simplicityprice and priority mechanisms
Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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