Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

DOI10.3982/ECTA19021zbMATH Open1541.62364MaRDI QIDQ6536797

Stefan Staubli, Andreas Haller, Josef Zweimüller

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

disability insurancescreeningbenefitspolicy reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Cites Work

• The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s
• Health, economic resources and the work decisions of older men
• Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.
• Estimating Outcome Distributions for Compliers in Instrumental Variables Models
• The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment
• Fuzzy Differences-in-Differences
• The Value of Unemployment Insurance
• A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies*
• Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

Related Items (1)

Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

This page was built for publication: Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6536797)