Flexible moral hazard problems
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Publication:6536805
DOI10.3982/ECTA21383zbMATH Open1541.91139MaRDI QIDQ6536805
George Georgiadis, Doron Ravid, Balázs Szentes
Publication date: 14 May 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- \(L_ p\)-Fréchet differentiable preference and ``local utility analysis
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
- The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
- Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent
- On the Subdifferentiability of Convex Functions
- Convex Analysis
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