Belief inducibility and informativeness

DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09963-7zbMATH Open1539.91039MaRDI QIDQ6540649

Toygar T. Kerman, Dominik Karos, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 17 May 2024

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ambiguous persuasion
• A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
• Two representations of information structures and their comparisons
• Bounds on the probability of radically different opinions
• The maximal difference among expert's opinions
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Competition in Persuasion
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• On the relationship between individual and group decisions
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications
• Interactive Information Design
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Information hierarchies

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