Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
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Publication:6541994
DOI10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7zbMATH Open1537.91114MaRDI QIDQ6541994
Indrajit Ray, Ricardo Gonçalves
Publication date: 21 May 2024
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
partitionsseparating equilibriumseller's revenuepooling equilibriumdiscrete bidsJapanese-English auctionswallet game
Cites Work
- Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
- Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- The discrete bid first auction
- Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
- A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
- Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK
- Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Inefficient rushes in auctions
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
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