Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
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Publication:654506
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014zbMath1229.91095OpenAlexW2020384227MaRDI QIDQ654506
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3129.pdf
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