Ironing without control

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003zbMath1243.91058OpenAlexW3124157455MaRDI QIDQ654524

Juuso Toikka

Publication date: 28 December 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationprincipal-agent modelmechanism designironingmonotonicity constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships ⋮ Screening while controlling an externality ⋮ Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling ⋮ An optimal slow Dutch auction ⋮ Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options ⋮ Non-convex isotonic regression via the Myersonian approach ⋮ Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies ⋮ Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency

Cites Work

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• A general theorem on necessary conditions in optimal control
• Monopoly and product quality
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Optimal bunching without optimal control
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Maximum Principle under Minimal Hypotheses
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Optimal control

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