Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:654529
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.018zbMath1239.91031OpenAlexW2570919071MaRDI QIDQ654529
Itzhak Gilboa, Nicolas Vieille, Hervé Crès
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepso50rh/resources/111cres-giloboa-vieille.pdf
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)
Related Items
Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences, Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis, Fair management of social risk, Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: a reappraisal, The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty, Aggregation of experts' opinions and conditional consensus opinion by the Steiner point, Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information, Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts, Aggregation of opinions and risk measures, Utilitarianism with and without expected utility, Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity, When upper conditional probabilities are conditional possibility measures, Understanding time-inconsistent heterogeneous preferences in economics and finance: a practice theory approach, Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives, Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form, Learning under unawareness
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
- Attitude toward imprecise information
- Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty
- Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?
- Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm
- Uncertainty Aversion with Second-Order Utilities and Probabilities
- Ambiguity and Second-Order Belief
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- The Opinion Pool
- Normal Bayesian Dialogues
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Marginalization and Linear Opinion Pools
- Integral Representation Without Additivity
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- Truth and Simplicity
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
