A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.02.005zbMath1229.91115OpenAlexW3123683907MaRDI QIDQ654531

Roberto Serrano, Takashi Kunimoto

Publication date: 28 December 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2004

zbMATH Keywords

measurabilitymechanism designincentive compatibilityexact and approximate implementationiteratively undominated strategiesrestricted deception-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Iterated bounded dominance ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Time and Nash implementation

Cites Work

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• Rationalizable implementation
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance

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