Complexity of conformant election manipulation
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Publication:6546592
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43587-4_13MaRDI QIDQ6546592
Edith Hemaspaandra, Zack Fitzsimmons
Publication date: 29 May 2024
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Cites Work
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- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
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- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
- The complexity of restricted spanning tree problems
- Dichotomy for Pure Scoring Rules Under Manipulative Electoral Actions
- Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
- Control and Bribery in Voting
- Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- A Short Proof of the Factor Theorem for Finite Graphs
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