The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001MaRDI QIDQ6546680

Jorge Peña, Aviad Heifetz, Georg Nöldeke

Publication date: 30 May 2024

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorycollective actionreplicator dynamicgroup size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Biology and other natural sciences (92-XX)

Cites Work

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