The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups
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Publication:6546680
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001MaRDI QIDQ6546680
Jorge Peña, Aviad Heifetz, Georg Nöldeke
Publication date: 30 May 2024
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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