Sequential mergers and delayed monopolization in triopoly

DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7zbMATH Open1537.91156MaRDI QIDQ6548531

Didier Laussel

Publication date: 1 June 2024

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

horizontal mergersMarkov-perfect equilibriumwar of attritionmonopolization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature
• Markov perfect equilibria in an N-player war of attrition
• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Bargaining and Reputation

Related Items (1)

Preface: Special issue of Dynamic Games and Applications in memory of Professor Ngo Van Long

This page was built for publication: Sequential mergers and delayed monopolization in triopoly