Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
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Publication:6549082
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.12.004zbMATH Open1537.91124MaRDI QIDQ6549082
Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Publication date: 3 June 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
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- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
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