Characterizations of approval ranking

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.001zbMath1537.91089MaRDI QIDQ6549087

Hiroyuki Komatsu

Publication date: 3 June 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationstrategy-proofnessapproval votingvoting rulesocial preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• A simple characterization of approval voting
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Characterizing approval voting
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Characterizations of approval ranking