Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:6549144
DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01487-xzbMATH Open1537.91126MaRDI QIDQ6549144
Publication date: 3 June 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- One-dimensional mechanism design
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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