Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games played over event trees
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Publication:6555199
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2023.10.016MaRDI QIDQ6555199
Georges Zaccour, Elena M. Parilina
Publication date: 14 June 2024
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
game theoryindividual rationalitypayment schemessustainability of cooperationdynamic games played over event trees
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