The impact of organizer market structure on participant entry behavior in a multi-tournament environment

DOI10.3390/g14010004zbMATH Open1541.9111MaRDI QIDQ6555565

Timothy Mathews, Soiliou Daw Namoro, James W. Boudreau

Publication date: 14 June 2024

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

tournamententry decisioncompeting organizersemployee compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Deffuant model of opinion formation in one-dimensional multiplex networks

Related Items (1)

Advances in the theory and applications of contests and tournaments: introduction to the special issue

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