Fighting for routes: resource allocation among competing planners in transportation networks
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Publication:6555615
DOI10.3390/G14030037zbMATH Open1542.91112MaRDI QIDQ6555615
Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
Publication date: 14 June 2024
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Potential and congestion games (91A14)
Cites Work
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