Training, abilities and the structure of teams

DOI10.3390/g14030044zbMATH Open1542.91121MaRDI QIDQ6555624

Tobias Hiller

Publication date: 14 June 2024

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

trainingproduction gamesabilitiesstructure of teams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
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• Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market

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