Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games

DOI10.3390/g15010002zbMATH Open1544.9102MaRDI QIDQ6555673

Mario Blázquez de Paz, Nikita Koptyug

Publication date: 14 June 2024

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionhawk-dove gamesquantal response methodrobustness to strategic uncertainty methodtracing procedure method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Product differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
• Endogenous price leadership
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
• Robustness to strategic uncertainty
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
• Price Leadership
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Proportional Residual Demand

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