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Cites Work

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Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
Two simple variations of top trading cycles
A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
House allocation with fractional endowments
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Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Pairwise kidney exchange
Assignment problems: a golden anniversary survey
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Consistency in house allocation problems
Matching with single-peaked preferences
An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
House allocation with existing tenants
On cores and indivisibility
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Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
My introduction to top-trading cycles
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Kidney Exchange
OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
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Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
Stability of an allocation of objects
Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

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