Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives

DOI10.1007/s11147-011-9067-4zbMath1230.91100OpenAlexW2092184111MaRDI QIDQ656075

Gong Zhan

Publication date: 26 January 2012

Published in: Review of Derivatives Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11147-011-9067-4

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemfee contracthedge fundhigh water mark

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

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