Foundations of the theory of conflict problems with partially overlapping interests

DOI10.1134/S1064562411030173zbMath1236.91098OpenAlexW1965839244MaRDI QIDQ656364

E. R. Smol'yakov

Publication date: 17 January 2012

Published in: Doklady Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064562411030173

zbMATH Keywords

\(A\)-equilibriumconflict equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Missing notions of equilibria for general game theory ⋮ A general approach to the theory of conflict problems with collateral interests of participants

Cites Work

• Conflict stable Pareto optimal equilibria
• Conflict individual-Pareto equilibria

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