Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.012zbMATH Open1544.9118MaRDI QIDQ6565028

Mathieu V. Leduc

Publication date: 1 July 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessocial capitalprincipal-agent problemsshock persistencesimple relational contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets
• Evolving market structure: An ACE model of price dispersion and loyalty
• Even up: maintaining relationships
• Labor union members play an OLG repeated game
• Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
• Cooperation with Network Monitoring
• Endogenous Production Networks

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