Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003zbMATH Open1544.9115MaRDI QIDQ6565029

[[Person:6147400|Author name not available (Why is that?)]], Audrey Hu, Jun Zhang

Publication date: 1 July 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designCournot competitionBayesian persuasionaftermarket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
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• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Competition in Persuasion
• Optimal Auction Design
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• An Integral Inequality

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