Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
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Publication:6565042
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.010zbMATH Open1544.91223MaRDI QIDQ6565042
Publication date: 1 July 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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