Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.006zbMATH Open1544.9107MaRDI QIDQ6565057

Ennio Bilancini, Juan Francisco Blazquiz-Pulido, Luca Polonio

Publication date: 1 July 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

trustlyingdeceptionsender-receiver gamestrategic communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Incentives and cheating
• Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Does the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Promises and Partnership

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