Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2024.02.011MaRDI QIDQ6565406

Laura Davila-Pena, Marcos Gómez-Rodríguez, Balbina Casas-Méndez

Publication date: 2 July 2024

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycost allocationa priori unionscoalitional valuesgeneralized highway problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

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