Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

DOI10.3982/TE4979MaRDI QIDQ6565778

Yiqiu Chen, Markus Möller

Publication date: 2 July 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingschool choiceregretmanipulationefficiency adjusted deferred acceptancestable-dominating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• The instability of matching with overconfident agents
• On cores and indivisibility
• Essentially stable matchings
• Manipulability in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
• School choice under partial fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6565778)