Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
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Publication:656582
DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006zbMath1229.68045OpenAlexW2026607260MaRDI QIDQ656582
Publication date: 18 January 2012
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006
controlcomputational complexityfixed parameter tractability\(W[1\)-hard]\(W[2\)-hard]Maximin election
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