On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.05.003zbMath1279.91103OpenAlexW2054533924MaRDI QIDQ656783

Flip Klijn

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/49174

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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