A matrix approach to TU games with coalition and communication structures

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0519-9zbMath1278.91016OpenAlexW2022475479MaRDI QIDQ656796

Gérard Hamiache

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0519-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ Axiomatization for the center-of-gravity of imputation set value ⋮ Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach ⋮ Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals ⋮ Associated games to optimize the core of a transferable utility game

Cites Work

• Matrix approach to dual similar associated consistency for the Shapley value
• On weighted Shapley values
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Associated consistency and Shapley value
• A MATRIX APPROACH TO THE ASSOCIATED CONSISTENCY WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE
• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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