Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0517-yzbMath1278.91047OpenAlexW2044656211WikidataQ56144025 ScholiaQ56144025MaRDI QIDQ656798

Forest W. Simmons, Jobst Heitzig

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0517-y

zbMATH Keywords

benchmarkvoting methodlotteryconsensus decision-makingfall-back methodrandom ballotstrong correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Cites Work

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• Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• Social choice with procedural preferences
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance

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