Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0504-3zbMath1278.91034OpenAlexW2068512374MaRDI QIDQ656801

Monisankar Bishnu, Sonali Roy

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p3894-2009-10-01.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index

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• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES

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