Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
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Publication:656803
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1zbMath1278.91051OpenAlexW2085650026MaRDI QIDQ656803
Mostapha Diss, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 13 January 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1
Related Items (10)
A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ Another perspective on Borda's paradox ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
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- The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
- A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
- Condorcet’s Paradox
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