Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1zbMath1278.91051OpenAlexW2085650026MaRDI QIDQ656803

Mostapha Diss, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ Another perspective on Borda's paradox ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser

Cites Work

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• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
• The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
• A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
• Condorcet’s Paradox

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