An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0520-3zbMath1278.91054OpenAlexW1983881102MaRDI QIDQ656805

Robert C. Powers, Lee R. Gibson

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0520-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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