The minimal covering set in large tournaments

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0503-4zbMath1278.91057OpenAlexW2162391183MaRDI QIDQ656810

Mark Fey, Alexander D. Scott

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0503-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Asymptotic enumeration (05A16) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ Condorcet winning sets ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments

Cites Work

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• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
• Choosing from a large tournament
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Optimal strategies for random tournament games
• A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
• Tournament games and positive tournaments
• Optimal Strategies for a Generalized "Scissors, Paper, and Stone" Game

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