Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9240-5zbMath1274.91162OpenAlexW3121841985MaRDI QIDQ656882

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Goldberger, Moshe Koppel

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3323.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcetsimple majority ruleoptimal aggregation rulevoting record

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information ⋮ The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting ⋮ On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees ⋮ Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution

Cites Work

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• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result

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