A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting

DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9229-0zbMath1274.91166OpenAlexW2058445865MaRDI QIDQ656886

Ronan Congar, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9229-0

zbMATH Keywords

maximinseparabilityvotingduplicationscoring rulescomplete ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey ⋮ Two characterizations of the dense rank ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ Confidence in preferences ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules

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• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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