Changing behaviour under unfairness: an evolutionary model of the ultimatum game
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Publication:6570302
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109078MaRDI QIDQ6570302
Gianni Arioli, Roberto Lucchetti, Giovanni Valente
Publication date: 10 July 2024
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- The chain store paradox
- The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
- Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game
- Game Theory
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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