Robustness to manipulations in school choice
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Publication:6570723
DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01504-zzbMATH Open1545.9119MaRDI QIDQ6570723
Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova, Alexander S. Nesterov
Publication date: 10 July 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Constrained school choice
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Manipulability in school choice
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- Robust Mechanism Design
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
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