Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games

DOI10.1007/s10479-023-05422-2zbMath1545.91011MaRDI QIDQ6573321

Jacqueline Morgan, Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano

Publication date: 16 July 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

convergenceasymptotic behaviorvariational stabilitysubgame perfect Nash equilibriumactions and/or payoffs perturbationtwo-player Stackelberg game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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