Delegation to incentivize information production

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.02.004zbMATH Open1545.91096MaRDI QIDQ6575501

Cheng Li, Huangxing Mao

Publication date: 20 July 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

biasdelegationorganizationBayesian persuasionsignal informativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Informational benefits of managerial myopia
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Optimal Delegation
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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