Analysis of the core under inequality-averse utility functions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.001zbMATH Open1545.91015MaRDI QIDQ6575511

Seiji Takanashi

Publication date: 20 July 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gameinequality aversionsocial preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Group preferences (91B10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• A preference foundation for Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity aversion
• An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• The egalitarian solution for convex games: Some characterizations.
• On the equal division core
• Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison
• Monotonicity and egalitarianism
• Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Altruistic Hedonic Games
• Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis

This page was built for publication: Analysis of the core under inequality-averse utility functions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6575511)