Iterative voting with partial preferences

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2024.104133zbMATH Open1545.91128MaRDI QIDQ6579295

Panagiotis Terzopoulos, Ulle Endriss, Zoi Terzopoulou

Publication date: 25 July 2024

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryiterative votingpartial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• The original Borda count and partial voting
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents
• Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score
• Convergence of Iterative Scoring Rules
• Introduction to the Theory of Voting

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