Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01403-3zbMath1545.91023MaRDI QIDQ6579446

Fabien Prieur, Wei H. Ruan, Benteng Zou, Raouf Boucekkine

Publication date: 25 July 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilitystochastic differential gamespolitical lobbyingsocial cost of lobbyingsymmetric versus asymmetric equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (1)

Sunk costs, entry and clustering

Cites Work

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