Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6580464
DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01513-6zbMATH Open1546.91142MaRDI QIDQ6580464
Publication date: 29 July 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Could not fetch data.
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Truncated leximin solutions
- Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
- Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution
- Non-optimal Nash bargaining solutions
- Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
- Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality
- The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems
- Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
- Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution
- Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution
- A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution
- Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- The Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
- Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points
- Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Individual disagreement point concavity and the bargaining problem
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
Related Items (1)
This page was built for publication: Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6580464)
