Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems

DOI10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5zbMATH Open1546.91143MaRDI QIDQ6580468

Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles

Publication date: 29 July 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• The package assignment model.
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• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
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• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

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