A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
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Publication:6580471
DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01515-4zbMATH Open1546.91124MaRDI QIDQ6580471
Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama
Publication date: 29 July 2024
Published in: (Search for Journal in Brave)
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