Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)

Cites Work

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Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions
The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
The positive core of a cooperative game
Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms
The Shapley value of exact assignment games
On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
Implementing the modified LH algorithm
Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
Star-shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games
Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps
An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations
The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
Cartels via the modiclus.
The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation
On a class of vertices of the core
Decomposing bivariate dominance for social welfare comparisons
Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
Homogeneous games as anti step functions
Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.
Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography
Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus
The bounded core for games with precedence constraints
Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems
Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms
Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games
On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
Advances in dynamic games. Applications to economics, management science, engineering, and environmental management
Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
Sequential legislative lobbying
The modiclus and core stability
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME
Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
Directed and weighted majority games
Preface
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
A Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
Reconfirming the Prenucleolus
Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
Minimal balanced collections and their application to core stability and other topics of game theory
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness

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